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Abstract
We construct a model where an entrepreneur could innovate for entry or for sale. It is
shown that increased product market competition tends to increase the relative proﬁtability
of innovation for sale. Increased competition reduces entrants’ and acquirers’ proﬁts in a
similar fashion, but also reduces the proﬁt of non-acquirers. Therefore, incumbents’ valua-
tions of innovations are less negatively aﬀected by increased competition, and the incentive
for innovation for sale can increase with increased competition. Moreover, a stricter, but
not too strict, merger policy is shown to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by
ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation.
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is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was written within the Gustaf Douglas Research Program on Entrepre-
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Entrepreneurial innovations, i.e. innovations made by outsiders to a speciﬁc industry, constitute
a crucial ingredient in a well-functioning market economy.1 Increased competition is generally
perceived as beneﬁcial for the functioning of a market; however, there are some concerns that
the incentives for entrepreneurial innovations can be reduced when product market competition
is too strong and hence, the rents accruing to the innovator are too small. This argument is
well established in the case where an entrepreneurial innovator commercializes the invention
herself.2 However, entrepreneurs could also sell their innovation (business) to incumbents and
we indeed observe a signiﬁcant amount of inter-ﬁrm technology transfers, ranging from joint
ventures and licensing to outright acquisitions of innovations.3 The purpose of this paper is to
study the impact of increased product market competition and strengthened competition policy
on the incentives for and the pattern of innovation for sale and innovation for entry.
To this end, we construct a model with the following ingredients: Initially, the intensity of
competition in an oligopolistic product market is determined by nature or policy. An entrepre-
neur then invests in an innovative activity that could lead to the creation of a unique productive
asset, which increases the proﬁt of the possessor and decreases the proﬁts of the rival ﬁrms. If
successful, the entrepreneur could then either sell the innovation to one of the incumbents in
an auction acquisition game or enter the product market.
We take our starting point in the fact that many of the formalizations of the intensity
of product market competition used in the literature, such as an increased number of ﬁrms
in an industry, lower entry costs, and increased substitutability between products, reduce the
short-run product market proﬁts.4 Our ﬁrst result then establishes that increased intensity
of competition tends to increase the proﬁtability of innovation for sale relative to innovation
for entry. The reason for this is that increased intensity of competition reduces entrants’ and
acquirers’ proﬁts in a similar fashion, but also reduces the proﬁt when not acquiring. This
implies that the incumbent’s willingness to pay for the innovation is less negatively aﬀected and
thus, the entrepreneur beneﬁts from selling the innovation instead of entering the market.
Then, we turn to how the intensity of competition aﬀects the incentive to innovate. First,
1 See, for instance, Acs and Audretsch (2005) and Baumol (2002) for such evidence.
2 This argument dates back at least to Schumpeter (1912) and since then, it has been formalized in
t h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r ei nd i ﬀerent contexts. In the Industrial Organization literature see, for instance,
Salop (1977) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977); in the endogenous growth literature see, for instance, Romer
(1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
3 Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) present evidence from Sweden and Hall (1990) presents evidence
from the US of ﬁrms acquiring innovative targets to gain access to their technologies. Bloningen and
Taylor (2000) ﬁnd evidence from US high-tech industries of ﬁrms making a strategic choice between the
acquisition of outside innovators and in-house R&D. In the biotech industry, Lerner and Merges (1998)
note that acquisitions are important for know-how transfers. OECD (2000, 2002) argues that established
ﬁrms often acquire ﬁrms to get access to new technologies.
4 See Aghion et al. (2005) for an overview of theories of intensity of competition and innovation.
Note that if ﬁrms are asymmetric, the most eﬃcient ﬁrms’ proﬁts might increase when product market
competition increases. See, for instance, Boone (2001, 2007) for examples of competition-oligopoly
models with such properties.
2we establish that in the case where the entrepreneur will commercialize the invention herself,
the classical Schumpetrian argument is indeed valid, i.e. increased competition reduces the
incentives for innovations. The reason is that the entrant’s product market proﬁtd e c r e a s e s
when competition is strengthened and thereby, the rents of innovations are reduced. However,
we show that increased product market competition can increase as well as decrease the incentive
to innovate in the case when innovations are for sale. The reason is that the incentive to innovate
then depends on the acquisition price of the invention. In equilibrium, the acquisition price of the
invention is a non-acquiring incumbent’s willingness to pay, which consists of two proﬁtt e r m s :
the expected product market proﬁtf o rt h i sﬁrm if it were instead to obtain the invention, and the
corresponding proﬁt when not buying. It then follows that the ﬁrst proﬁt term decreases when
competition increases. However, the second proﬁt term will also decrease, which implies that
the willingness to pay can increase as well as decrease when competition increases, depending
on which is the dominating eﬀect. Consequently, the fear that increased intensity of product
market competition risks harming the incentive to innovate seems less motivated when taking
into account that entrepreneurs can sell their innovations.
The venture capital industry provides some insightful anecdotal evidence of the relation
between innovation for sale and innovation for entry and competition. Figure 1.1 depicts the
quarterly value of exits through M&As and IPOs, respectively, in the US in the stage 1999
to 2005. Note that M&As dominate as the exit mode, except at the beginning of the stage.
According to The Economist (1999)5, the exit strategy of venture capital ﬁrms changed from
initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) to exit by sale in the late 1990’s: ”Over the past year or so,
however, venture-capital ﬁrms’ exit strategy has changed. ... more and more entrepreneurs
a r es t a r t i n ge n t e r p r i s e sw i t ht h ee x p r e s sp u r p o s eo fb e i n gb o u g h to u ti nd u ec o u r s e . ”Moreover,
according to The Economist (1999), innovators know that incumbent ﬁrms that risk tough
competition from not buying are willingt op a yag r e a td e a lf o ri n n o v a t i o n s .6
N e x t ,w ei n v e s t i g a t et h ee ﬀects of a strict merger policy which aims at stimulating compe-
tition by not allowing mergers leading to markets with too high concentration.7 Merger law
in most developed countries blocks mergers that increase the concentration levels too much
at already high levels.8 To this end, we assume that the government initially sets the merger
policy by committing to a minimum number of ﬁrms allowed in the product market and that
the merger market forces will then create a market structure with that number of ﬁrms. Then,
we show that the incentive for innovation for sale relative to innovation for entry will increase
under a stricter merger policy, due to the mechanism described above. A stricter merger policy
increases the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market, which decreases both the entrant’s and
the acquiring incumbent’s proﬁt in a similar fashion. But also the proﬁt of the non-acquiring
incumbents decreases which implies that the sales price decreases less than the entrant’s proﬁt.
5 ”Easy way out”, The Economist, Feb 18 1999.
6 An example is Cerent, which was acquired by Cisco at $6.9 billion.
7 See Motta (2004) and Katz and Shelanski (2005) for a description of merger policy in the EU and
the US, respectively.
8 See Katz and Shelanski (2005) for the US and Motta (2004) for the EU. In evaluating horizon-
tal mergers, the US Agency considers both the post-merger market concentration and the increase in
















Figure 1.1: The value of exits through M&A and IPO in the US. Source: Thomson Venture
Economics/National Venture Capital Association.
Moreover, we show that a strict, but not too strict, merger policy increases the incentive for
innovations for sale. Increasing the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in very concentrated markets
increases the incentive for innovation for sale, since the bidding competition over the innovation
then increases, whereas increasing the number of ﬁrms in less concentrated markets leads to
a reduced incentive for innovation for sale. The reason is that the fall in the product market
price will hurt the larger acquiring ﬁrm more, thereby reducing the sales price of the innovation.
Hence, we have established an inversely U-shaped incentive for innovation for sale of a stricter
merger policy.
We make three contributions to the large literature on innovation and competition.9
First, we contribute by examining how the intensity of product market competition aﬀects
the pattern of innovation for sale and innovation for entry allowing for bidding competition
over the invention. The existing literature shows that the incentive for innovation for sale
(incumbent preemptive innovation) decreases if the intensity of product market competition
increases (Gilbert and Newbery (1982,1992) and Vickers (1985)). The reason is that the entry
proﬁt decreases less than the entry deterring value in intensity of product market competition.
However, this literature views the sale of the invention as an isolated bargaining between the
entrant and one incumbent. Our contribution here is to allow all incumbents to participate in
the bidding competition. We then show that increased intensity of product market competition
increases the incentive for innovation for sale relative to the incentive for innovation for entry.
The reason for this is that increased intensity of product market competition increases the
bidding competition among incumbents over the invention and thereby increases the reward for
innovation for sale.
9 For overviews of the literature on innovation and competition see, for instance, Aghion et al. (2005),
Motta (2004) and Gilbert (2006).
4Second, we add to the existing literature by examining how the intensity of product market
competition aﬀects the incentive to innovate by also considering innovation for sale. The pre-
vious literature on outsider innovation and competition shows that the incentive for innovation
increases if and only if there is an increase in the entrant’s proﬁt.(Aghion and Howitt (1992),
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Salop (1977).10 T h el i t e r a t u r eo n
incumbent innovation and competition shows that increased intensity of competition increases
the incentive for innovation if and only if the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the market
with the invention and the proﬁt it makes in the market absent the invention increases (the
"escape-competition eﬀect" identiﬁed in Aghion et al. (2005) and present in Vives (2008), and
related to the Arrow (1962) classical replacement eﬀect). We contribute by showing that in-
creased intensity of competition increases the incentive for innovation for sale if and only if
the diﬀerence between the with-innovation rents and the without-innovation rents in the market
with the invention increases. This implies that the proﬁts in the pre-innovation market do not
aﬀect the incentive to innovate for sale.
Third, we contribute to the literature by examining how competition policy aﬀects the
incentive for innovation for sale. In the previous literature, competition policy has been shown
to play an important role for the innovation incentive by once more aﬀecting the relation between
the proﬁt in the market with the invention and the proﬁt in the market absent the invention
(Aghion et al. 2005) and by aﬀecting the time ﬂow of rents (Segal and Whinston 2007). Here, we
identify another important role of competition (merger) policy for the incentive for innovation
through its eﬀect on the intensity of competition over innovations for sale, thereby increasing
the incentive to innovate for sale.
The paper also adds to the literature on the pattern of commercialization for entry and
sale (licence) which shows that commercialization by sale (licence) is more likely when entry
costs are high, the entrepreneurial ﬁrm lacks complementary assets, brokers facilitating trade
are available, and the expropriation problem associated with asset transfers is low.11 Our
contribution is here to show that when the innovation will be commercialized in an oligopolistic
market, it is more likely that the innovation is commercialized through the sale to an incumbent
when the intensity of product market competition increases.
This paper also relates to the literature on auctions with externalities (see, for instance,
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996, 1999)) which has shown that the externalities associated
10 Boone (2001) also studies how the intensity of competition aﬀects innovation for sale. In fact, our
deﬁnition of intensity of competition is inspired by Boone (2001) which uses four conditions on how
proﬁts are aﬀected by intensity of competition. However, his third condition states that if the leader is
suﬃciently far ahead, he gains as competition becomes more intense, i.e. 
  0 for the leader. This
is not a necessary condition in our set-up for the result that increased intensity of competition increases
the incentive for innovation for sale.
Moreover, Boone uses a speciﬁc set-up where the innovator cannot enter but can make a take-or-leave-it
oﬀer to the incumbents. Instead, we use the auction with an externality set-up (see, for instance, Jehiel,
Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1999) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000)). This enables us to more generally
solve for the equilibrium ownership (EOS) of the invention and undertake illustrative comparative statics
(intensity of product market competition, bidding competition and synergies) on the EOS.
11 See, for instance, Anton and Yao (1994), Chan, Nickerson and Owan (2009), Gans and Stern (2000,
2003), Gans et al. (2002), Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Teece (1987).
5with the use of an object for sale will aﬀect the equilibrium identity of the buyer, the sales price,
and that traditional auction formats need then not be eﬃcient. We add to this literature by
endogenizing the eﬀort to undertake R&D to provide inventions with externalities for sale in an
environment where the potential seller can choose to sell the asset or use it to compete with the
potential buyers, and by examine how this incentives depend on the intensity of competition in
the market.12
This paper can also be seen as a contribution to the literature on entrepreneurship and inno-
vations.13 We extend this literature by allowing for the interaction between entrepreneurs and
oligopolist in the innovation process and study how the intensity of competition and competition
policy aﬀects the incentive for entrepreneurial innovations.14
In Section 2, an illustrative example of the main mechanism of the paper is presented.
The model is spelled out in Section 3. Section 4 studies the eﬀects of increased intensity of
competition on the pattern of entry and sale and the incentive to innovate. In Section 5, we
study how merger policy aﬀects the pattern of entry and sale and the incentive to innovate. In
Section 6, we explore how our results are aﬀected by allowing the entrepreneur to sell licences
of a patent of its innovation, allowing for synergies, and allowing for asymmetric ﬁrms. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2. A simple example
We here illustrate the main mechanisms of the paper in a very simple setting before turning to
the main model. This a simpliﬁed version of the Cournot model with diﬀerentiated products
(CDP model) presented in detail in Section 4 below. Consider a three-stage game where a
product market is initially served by two symmetric incumbents, 1 and 2. There is also an
entrepreneur, denoted , which undertakes an eﬀort to create an invention denoted with a given
quality ¯ .
The ﬁnal stage 3 is a Cournot model with diﬀerentiated products, where incumbents (or the
incumbents and the entrepreneur) face inverse demand
( −)= −  − − (2.1)
where  ∈ (01] is the (inverse) level of product diﬀerentiation (a larger  gives more homogenous
products).15 Note that  gives a natural measure of product market competition.L e t  =
[ −] be the direct proﬁt function where  =  when ﬁrm  does not possess the invention
12Most papers in this literature treat the size of the asset for sale as exogenous. To our knowledge, the only
exception are Katz and Shapiro (1986) who determine the optimal licensing fee of a research lab which can aﬀect
the size of the innovation and Norbäck and Persson (2009) who determine the optimal development investment
for an venture-backed ﬁrm that will exit bu a trade sale to an incumbent.
See Segal (1999) for a paper on contracting with externalities.
13 For overviews, see Acs and Audretsch (2005) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005).
14 Baumol (2004) stresses the importance of the diﬀerent roles played by small entrepreneurial ﬁrms
and large established ﬁrms in the innovation process in the US, where small entrepreneurial ﬁrms create
a large share of breakthrough innovations and where large established ﬁrms provide more routinized
R&D.
15 For ease of presentation, we omit the monopoly case of  =0 
6and  = −¯  is the marginal cost when ﬁrm  possesses the invention. From the Nash-quantities
in the product market interaction q∗()=( ∗
()∗
−()),l e t()=[ (q∗())−]∗
() be the
reduced-form proﬁto fﬁrm , where  indicates which ﬁrm owns the innovation .I n s t a g e
2, the entrepreneur decides whether to enter the market or sell the invention to one of the
incumbents (i.e.  is determined). The market structures can then be Duopoly (D) or Triopoly
(T). In stage 1, the entrepreneur expands the eﬀort to innovate (to increase the probability of
inventing an innovation with quality ¯ ).
The typical concern in the literature is that the product market proﬁts of all ﬁrm types
decrease in the level of intensity of product market competition, i.e.
()
  0, and thereby the
incentive for innovation is reduced. Let us focus on this case. It can then be shown that there
is a region  ∈ (0 ˜ ] where
()
  0 is fulﬁlled.16
In stage 2, there is an entry-acquisition auction where incumbents simultaneously post bids
and the entrepreneur then either accepts or rejects these bids; if it rejects the bids, the entre-
preneur will enter the market if and only if the product market proﬁt covers the entry cost .
There are three diﬀerent valuations which need to be considered:
•  is the entry value (or reservation price) i.e. the proﬁt for the entrepreneur when
competing with both incumbents (
() − ):
 = 
() −  (2.2)
•  is the entry-deterring valuation, i.e. an incumbent’s proﬁt of possessing the invention,






•  is the preemptive valuation, i.e. an incumbent’s proﬁt of possessing the invention 
())





Figure 2.1 (i) shows the diﬀerent valuations of the invention for the diﬀerent owners, and
how these valuations depend on the intensity of product market competition measured through
the level of product diﬀerentiation . Figure 2.1 (ii) summarizes the Equilibrium Ownership
Structure (EOS). Figure 2.1 (iii) summarizes the reward to the entrepreneur  as a function
of the intensity of product market competition.
To highlight our main mechanism, we assume that the entry cost  is at a level such that
   at  close to zero. Thus, at a low intensity of product market competition, the
entrepreneur has a stronger incentive to commercialize through entry than through sale. What
then occurs if intensity of competition increases? As illustrated in Figure 2.1 (i), (2.2) implies
16 See Lemma 4, below.








Now turn to incumbents’ valuations. Note that without synergies between the invention
and incumbents’ assets, it immediately follows that  −  = 
() − 
()  0. Then,
























Thus, the entry-deterring valuation of an incumbent  increases (decreases less than the en-
trepreneur’s value of entry ) when the intensity of product market competition increases. The
reason for this is that a higher intensity of product market competition decreases entrants’ and






 is small in absolute value). However, since
the proﬁt of a non-acquirer 
() decreases in , this creates an additional increase in the
incumbent valuation, thereby implying that 
  
 . In fact, as shown in Figure 2.1 (i), the
negative eﬀect on the non-acquirer

()









Thus, at increased product market competition, a sale of the innovation becomes more likely
since 
  
 from (2.6). At  = ,  =  holds and further increases in intensity of
product market competition  will make an entry deterring acquisition strictly proﬁtable as
  . As shown in Figure 2.1(ii), an acquisition of the invention then takes place at price
∗ =  = 
() −  This is illustrated at point ED in Figure 2.1(i).
A further increase in product market competition  will lead to incumbents’ preemptive
























A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 . 1 ( i ) ,a t = ,  =  holds. This induces a bidding war among
incumbents which drives the equilibrium sales price above the entry value for the entrepreneur,
i.e. ∗ = .
Using Figure 2.1(i) and (ii), we can then state our ﬁrst result:
Result 1 Suppose that the intensity of product market competition increases. The acquiring in-
cumbent’s willingness to pay is less negatively aﬀected than the entrepreneur’s reservation
price, since increased intensity of product market competition also makes it less favorable
to become a non-acquirer. Thus, higher intensity of product market competition can lead
to commercialization by sale to an incumbent.
17See the Appendix.
18See the Appendix for proofs.
8l∗  e l∗  i l∗  i































 (Competition)  ̃
ve  E
Te − F
v ie  A
Di − N
Te
v ii  A
Di − N
Di
Figure 2.1: Why stronger competition leads to more commercialization by sale and increased
innovation incentives for entrepreneurs. Parameter values at: Λ =  −  =3 ,  =1 
9In stage 1, the entrepreneur decides how much to invest in research, depending on the reward






,  ∈ [0),
∗ = ,  ∈ [),
∗ = ,  ∈ [ ˜ ].
(2.8)
We can then immediately state the following result:
Result 2 Suppose that the intensity of product market competition increases. The reward for
innovation for sale can then increase (even though the incentive for innovation for entry
decreases). The reason is that increased intensity of product market competition increases
the bidding competition over the invention.
Finally, let us add a stage 0 where a merger between the two incumbents 1 and 2 is
proposed to the competition authority which may then block this merger. It then follows that
the entrepreneur’s incentive to innovate may be substantially smaller after a merger. To see
this, note that the entrepreneur obtains  =  = 
() − 
() under high intensity of
product market competition ( ) absent the merger since the incumbents compete to
acquire the invention. When the merger is allowed, t h es i n g l ei n c u m b e n tw i l lo n l yo ﬀer the
entrepreneur her reservation price and thus the reward becomes 
Merger




(), it follows that the reward for the entrepreneur absent a merger ()i s
higher than the reward with a merger (
Merger
 )i ﬀ  
(). The latter condition is more




Thus, we can state the following result:
Result 3 Suppose that the intensity of product market competition is strong. Merger policy
can then increase the reward to innovation by sustaining the bidding competition over the
invention.
In a very simple setting, we have shown several new aspects of product market competition.
Strong product market competition induces entrepreneurs to sell new inventions to incumbent
ﬁrms; strong product market competition can increase innovation incentives under commercial-
ization by sale; merger policy is important for the reward to innovation by sustaining bidding
competition. We will now turn to the main model where we show under which conditions these
three results hold in a more general setting.
3. The Model
Consider a market served by  symmetric incumbent ﬁrms. There is also an entrepreneur,
denoted , investing in an innovative activity that could lead to the creation of a unique pro-
ductive asset, denoted ¯  The interaction is illustrated in Figure 3.1. In stage 1, the intensity
of competition  is determined by nature (or government policy as in section 5). In stage 2,
the entrepreneur decides how much to invest in research, thereby aﬀecting the probability of
10Success Failure
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Figure 3.1: The sequence of the game.
discovering ¯ . In stage 3, given successful innovation, one of the incumbent ﬁrms acquires the
entrepreneur’s assets ¯ , or the entrepreneur enters the market. Depending on the level of the
intensity of competition, there may be exits of non-acquiring incumbents. Finally, in stage 4,
ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion.
3.1. Stage 4: product market interaction
L e tt h es e to fﬁrms in the industry be J = ×I,w h e r eI ={1 2} is the set of incumbent
ﬁrms. There are  incumbent ﬁrms. Let the set of potential ownerships of the entrepreneur’s
innovation, ¯ ,b e = {1 2}.
( : ¯ ) denotes the variable product market proﬁto fﬁrm ,w h e r ex =( 1)
is the vector of actions taken by ﬁrms in product market interaction,  keeps track of the identity
of the ﬁrm owning the innovation, ¯  denotes the quality of the innovation and  denotes the
intensity of product market competition. We are now set to describe the optimal behavior in
product market interaction. Firm  chooses an action  ∈ + to maximize its product market
proﬁt, denoted ( − : ) − ,w h e r e− is the set of actions taken by ’s rivals where we
have omitted ¯  and  as arguments. Firms pay a ﬁxed cost  to serve the market. The action
 may be considered as setting a quantity or a price, as will be shown in later sections. We
assume there to exist a unique Nash-Equilibrium, ∗ (),d e ﬁned as:
(∗
 ∗
− : ) ≥ ( ∗
− : ) (3.1)
11where we assume the product market proﬁts to be positive.
From (3.1), we can deﬁne a reduced-form product market proﬁtf o raﬁrm , taking as given
ownership , since:
 () ≡ (∗
 () ∗
−()) (3.2)
The assumption that incumbents 1 2  are symmetric before the acquisition takes
place implies that we need only distinguish between two types of ownership; entrepreneurial
ownership ( = )a n dincumbent ownership ( = ). Note that there are three types of ﬁrms
of which to keep track,  = {}, i.e. the entrepreneurial ﬁrm (), an acquiring incumbent
() and non-acquiring incumbents ().
Given that a sale of the innovation ¯  occurs,  () denotes the acquiring ﬁrm’s reduced-form
product market proﬁta n d () the corresponding proﬁt for a non-acquirer. If no sale occurs
and the entrepreneur enters the market,  () denotes the entrepreneurial ﬁrm’s reduced-form
product market proﬁta n d () the corresponding proﬁt for an incumbent.
Let us ﬁnally deﬁne the quality of the innovation ¯  and the intensity of competition  in the
model. Typically, the value of innovations in the market will diﬀer substantially. To capture
this aspect, we deﬁne the quality of an innovation as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Quality of the innovation: when the quality of the innovation increases,










Deﬁnition 1 is valid in the Diﬀerentiated Product Cournot (CDP) model which is presented
in more detail below, but it is also compatible with other oligopoly models (e.g. Farrell and
Shapiro (1996)), where increased quality is interpreted as increased size of capital holdings.19
The intensity of product market competition  is not a well deﬁned concept and many
diﬀerent kinds of formalizations have been used in the literature. However, in many formaliza-
tions, product market proﬁts will be reduced when the intensity of product market competition
is increased.20 We then make the following deﬁnition of competition:
Deﬁnition 2. Intensity of product market competition: when the intensity of product
market competition increases, there is a decrease in the product market proﬁts for all ﬁrm types




For instance, it is shown in the Appendix that the deﬁnition is valid for a large parameter set
in the CDP model, where we model increased competition as increased substitutability between
products or as an increase in the number of ﬁrms. The Appendix shows that the results also
extend into Bertrand competition. Moreover, it can be shown that the deﬁnition is also valid
in a Shubik-Levitan type of diﬀerentiated product model and in a Salop type of circular model
of horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
19 Note that the deﬁnition may not hold if there are strong technological spillovers between ﬁrms.
20 See Aghion et al. (2005) for overviews of theories of intensity of competition and innovation, and
Boone (2007) for a measure of competition based on the relative proﬁts of eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
123.2. Stage 3: the acquisition-entry-exit game
In stage 3, there is a ﬁrst period with an entry-acquisition game where the entrepreneur can
decide whether to sell the innovation to one of the incumbents or enter the market. Given
the mode of commercialization of the innovation, there is a second period, with an exit game,
where non-acquiring incumbents might exit. The possessor of the innovation is assumed to
always make positive proﬁts, i.e. () ,  = .
Formally, exits of non-acquiring incumbents will occur until the total number of ﬁrms on
the market () fulﬁls the exit condition:
( : ())    ( : ()+1 ) (3.3)
The acquisition-entry process is depicted as an auction where  incumbents simultaneously
post bids and the entrepreneur then either accepts or rejects these bids; if it rejects the bids,
the entrepreneur will enter the market if and only if it is proﬁtable. Each incumbent announces
ab i d ,, for the invention.  =( 1 ) ∈  is the vector of these bids. Following the
announcement of , the invention may be sold to one of the incumbents at the bid price, or
remain in the ownership of the entrepreneur, . If more than one bid is accepted, the bidder
with the highest bid obtains the invention. If there is more than one incumbent with such a
bid, each such incumbent obtains the invention with equal probability. The acquisition is solved
for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a smallest amount, , chosen such
that all inequalities are preserved if  is added or subtracted.
There are three diﬀerent valuations which need to be considered:
•  is the value for an incumbent of obtaining ¯ , when a rival incumbent would otherwise
obtain ¯ 
 = () −  − (i)[() − ] (3.4)
The ﬁrst term shows the proﬁt when possessing the innovation, ¯ . The second term shows
the expected proﬁti far i v a li n c u m b e n to b t a i n s¯ ,w h e r e()=
()−1
−1 is the probability of
remaining in the market as a non-acquirer under a sale of the innovation since  − 1 is the
maximum number of non-acquiring incumbents under a sale and () − 1 is the number of
non-acquiring incumbents remaining on the market given from (3.3).
•  is the value for an incumbent of obtaining ¯ , when the entrepreneur would otherwise
keep them
 = () −  − (e)[() − ] (3.5)
The proﬁt for an incumbent of not obtaining invention ¯  is diﬀerent in this case, due to the
change of identity of the ﬁrm which would otherwise possess the assets ¯ ,w h e r e()=
()−1

is the probability of remaining in the market as a non-acquirer when entry occurs,  is the
maximum number of non-acquiring incumbents when entry occurs and () − 1 is the number
of non-acquiring incumbents remaining in the market, given from (3.3).
13•  is the value for the entrepreneur of keeping ¯ 
 = () −  −  (3.6)
where the entrepreneur has the entry cost  Note also that we assume that ()=0 ,s ot h a t
the entrepreneur cannot enter the market without ownership of the innovation. An alternative
interpretation is that  is the value for an outside ﬁrm, i.e. a ﬁrm without initial assets in the
industry, of acquiring the entrepreneur’s innovation.
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). Since incum-
bents are symmetric, valuations   and  can be ordered in six diﬀerent ways, as shown in
table 3.1. These inequalities are useful for solving the model and illustrating the results. We
can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price are described in
table 3.1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Table 3.1: Equilibrium ownership structure and acquisition price.
Inequality: Deﬁnition: Ownership ∗: Acquisition price, ∗: Entrepreneurial reward, :
1:      i  
2:       or    or 
3:      i  
4:      i  
5:      e . 
6:      e . 
Lemma 1 shows that when one of the inequalities 1 3,o r4 holds, ¯  is obtained by one of
the incumbents. Under 1 and 3, the acquiring incumbent pays the acquisition price  = ,
and  =  under 4.W h e n5 or 6 holds, the entrepreneur keeps its assets. When 2 holds,
there exist multiple equilibria.
3.3. Stage 2: innovation activity
In stage 2, entrepreneur  undertakes an eﬀort  to discover an innovation. Assume that the
probability of succeeding with an innovation is simply the eﬀort, i.e.  ∈ [01] and that 
can be privately chosen by the entrepreneur at an increasing and convex cost (),i . e .0()  0
and 00()  0. Π = () − () is then the expected net proﬁt for the entrepreneur,





 I5 or I6 and  = 
 I4 and  = 
 I 1 ,I 2o rI 3a n d = 
 (3.7)





= () − 0(∗
()) = 0, (3.8)





Applying the implicit function theorem in (3.8), we can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. The equilibrium eﬀort by the entrepreneur in stage 2, ∗
() and hence, the proba-




4. Intensity of competition, mode of commercialization and the entrepreneur’s
incentives to innovate
In this section, we examine how entry and sale patterns and the entrepreneur’s incentive to
innovate depend on the intensity of product market competition, . In order to isolate the
strategic eﬀect of intensity of competition on the entrepreneur’s choice between entering and
selling the innovation, we assume that the entrant and the acquirer make symmetric use of
assets and obtain a symmetric market position when exposed to the same market conditions,
i.e. ()=() for ()=() We refer to such entry as large scale entry and note that
one possibility is that large scale entry takes place through a sale to a large ﬁrm outside this
industry that uses the innovation to enter the market. Then, we note that Lemma 1 implies
that a sale takes place if and only if  −   0. To proceed, we will now examine the net
value of an incumbent acquisition, i.e. the diﬀerence between the incumbents’ valuations and
the entry value for the entrepreneur,  − . Using (3.4)-(3.6), we have:
 −  =[ () − ()+] − (l)[() − ] = {}. (4.1)
The ﬁrst term is an innovation-transfer eﬀect and shows the change in proﬁts from an ownership
change of the innovation from the entrepreneur to an incumbent ﬁrm. The second term can be
viewed as the opportunity cost of an ownership change, since this terms captures the proﬁtf o r
an incumbent when not acquiring the innovation.
The fact that the innovation will be used in the market may generate the exit of some of
the incumbents. The exit pattern will depend on the quality of the innovation, the level of the
intensity of competition, entry mode and the demand and cost structure. In the below analysis,
we will make a distinction between three cases: no exit, exit by one ﬁrm when entry takes place
21 If 2 in table 3.1 arises, we assume that entry through sale occurs.
15and multiple-ﬁrm exits. We start with the assumption that one ﬁrm exits when entry takes
place to illustrate the main mechanism.
Again, we will frequently use the Cournot model with Diﬀerentiated Products (CDP Model)
to illustrate results. The CDP Model is described in Example 1. A Bertrand model with a
Diﬀerentiated Products Model (BDP Model) is given in Example 2. A full representation of
the exit pattern (no exit, one ﬁrm exit, and multiple-ﬁrm exit) and equilibrium outcomes in the
CDP Model is presented in Figure 4.3.
4.1. Why increased intensity of competition is conducive to innovation for sale
To highlight the strategic diﬀerence between entering and selling the innovation, we will ﬁrst
examine the case where entry does not aﬀect the long-run equilibrium market structure. Thus,
if a sale occurs, there are  active ﬁrms in the market, whereas if entry occurs there are still
 active ﬁrms in the market since one incumbent will exit, i.e. ()=()=.W e w i l l
then study the case where no exit occurs in Section 4.3.1 and where multiple ﬁrm exit occurs
in Section 4.3.2.
To proceed, we then use the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3. ( ¯ ()) =  for  = 
¯ () is thus the maximum intensity of competition such that all non-acquirers can cover their
ﬁxed cost  associated with serving the market. It follows that ¯ ()  ¯ () since non-acquirers’
proﬁts will be lower with one more ﬁrm in the market.
We then make the following assumption:
Assumption A1 Market—structure-neutral-entry:  ∈ ( ¯ () ¯ ()).
Thus, when  ∈ ( ¯ () ¯ ()), entry by the entrepreneur leads to the exit of one incumbent
ﬁrm. Assumption A1 implies that the entrant obtains exactly the same market position as
would the acquiring incumbent in the case of a sale of the innovation, i.e. ()=().
Moreover, since one of the incumbents is forced out of the market under entry, we have that
the probability of remaining in the market for a non-acquiring incumbent is (i) = 1  (e) =
−1
  0 T h u s ,( 4 . 1 )c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
 −  =
(




[() − ] = 
 −  =  − [() − ] = 
 (4.2)
where the innovation-transfer eﬀect is now simply the ﬁxed cost savings, .  −  then
represents the net value for an incumbent of deterring entry,w h e r e a s− represents the net
value for an incumbent of preempting rivals from obtaining the entrepreneur’s innovation.
To proceed, we then make use of the following deﬁnition:
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Figure 4.1: Mode of commercialization and intensity of competition.
17 is thus the level of competition where the entry-deterring motive for an incumbent
acquisition just matches the entrepreneur’s entry value, whereas  is the level of competition
where the preemptive motive for an incumbent acquisition is equal to the entrepreneur’s entry
value.
We can then state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption A1 holds and  and  exist. Then, (i) com-
mercialization by entry takes place if competition is suﬃciently low,  ∈ ( ¯ ()),( i i )
commercialization by sale occurs at sales price ∗ =  if competition is of intermediate size,
 ∈ [), and (iii) commercialization by sale occurs at sales price ∗ =  if competition
is suﬃciently high,  ∈ [ ¯ ()).
Proposition 1 is proved below and is also illustrated in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1(i) solves the
acquisition entry game as a function of the intensity of competition, . When the intensity
of competition is low  ∈ ( ¯ ())), the net value for entry deterrence is negative, i.e. an
incumbent’s entry deterring valuation is lower than the entrant’s entry value,  −   0.
Intuitively, at low competition, the opportunity cost of an acquisition is high for an incumbent.







  0 (4.3)
where we use 0
 as the notation for the derivative, 

Thus, the entry-deterring valuation of an incumbent  increases more than the entre-





() decreases with the same amount as the ﬁrst term in  = ()−,s i n c e
the acquiring incumbent and the entrepreneur face the same negative eﬀect of increased compe-
tition from Assumption A1. However, since the proﬁt of a non-acquirer () decreases in ,
this creates an increase in the incumbent’s valuation, thereby implying that 0
  0
.T h u s ,





in competition , an entry deterring acquisition at the acquisition price ∗ =  = () − 
occurs at  = , as shown in Figure 4.1(ii). Other incumbents will not preempt a ri-
val acquisition in the region  ∈ [), since the net value of preemption is negative,
 −   0.
However, note that increasing the intensity of competition further into the region,  ≥ 
will imply that the net value of preemption is strictly positive,  −   0. This induces a
bidding war between incumbents driving the equilibrium sales price above the entry value for
the entrepreneur, ∗ =  = () − ()  .
To complete the analysis, Figure 4.1(iii) shows how equilibrium ownership is jointly deter-
mined by the quality of the innovation ¯  and the intensity of competition .L e t ()
be the takeover condition (TO-condition) deﬁned from (¯ )=(¯ ) and let
() be the preemption condition (PE-condition) deﬁned from (¯ )=(¯ ).



















  0 holds from Deﬁnition 1 and
()
  0 holds from Deﬁnition 2.
The loci associated with the takeover condition () and the preemption condition
() are downward-sloping in the − space. Intuitively, at a higher intensity of compe-
tition , a lower quality of the innovation is needed to balance the incumbent’s higher value of
obtaining the innovation (i.e. to preserve a zero net value  =  for  = ). The equilibrium
ownership structure involves innovation for entry below the takeover locus (), indicated
as ∗ = . Takeover acquisitions occur for combinations of  and  between the takeover lo-
cus () and the preemption locus (), indicated as ∗ =  and ∗ = . Preemptive
acquisitions occur above preemption locus () as indicated by ∗ =  and ∗ = .T h u s ,
innovation for sale is conducive to markets where there is a high-quality innovation for sale and
intense competition. Once more, this reﬂects a low opportunity cost of an acquisition, due to
incumbents’ weak position as non-acquirers.
4.2. Why increased competition may increase the incentive to innovate under in-
novation for sale
Let us now examine how competition aﬀects the entrepreneur’s incentive to innovate. To high-
light the eﬀect of competition on innovation incentives, we maintain Assumption A1. The
following proposition concerning innovation incentives for the entrepreneur is then immediate:
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption A1 holds and  and  exist. Then: (i) the
incentive to innovate for entry decreases when the intensity of competition  increases, (ii) for
 ∈ [ ¯ ()) the innovation incentives are stronger under innovation for sale than under
innovation for entry, (iii) the incentive to innovate for sale can increase when the intensity of
competition  increases.
The proposition is proved in Figure 4.2, where Figure 4.2(iii) now depicts the reward of
the entrepreneur () as a function of the intensity of competition .W h e n i n t e n s i t y o f
competition is low  ∈ ( ¯ ())) innovation for entry occurs and the reward ()= =
() −  −  for the entrepreneur. From Deﬁnition 2, () is decreasing in competition
and from Lemma 2, innovation incentives are reduced. The same holds if an entry deterring
acquisition occurs in region  ∈ [) since ()=∗ = .
However, when competition is more intense  ≥  and preemptive acquisitions occur,
the reward for innovation for sale is strictly higher than the reward for innovation for entry,
()=   = () which, from Lemma 2, implies that the entrepreneur is more likely
to succeed under innovation for sale, ∗
()  ∗
().
The eﬀect of increased intensity of competition on innovation incentives under innovation
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Figure 4.2: Entrepreneurial reward to innovation and the intensity of competition.
20In equilibrium, the acquisition price ∗ of the invention is a non-acquiring incumbent’s
willingness to pay , which consists of two proﬁt terms: the product market proﬁtf o rt h i s
ﬁrm if it were instead to obtain the invention (), and the corresponding proﬁtw h e nn o t
buying, () i.e. ∗ = ()−(). It then follows that the ﬁrst proﬁt term decreases when
competition increases. However, the second proﬁt term will also decrease, which implies that
the willingness to pay can increase as well as decrease when competition increases, depending
on which is the dominating eﬀect.
L e m m a3a n dL e m m a4p r o v i d et w oe x a m p l e sw h e re the incentive to innovate for sale
increase when the intensity of competition  increases.
Example 1 (Cournot competition with diﬀerentiated products (CDP Model)). The
inverse demand of a ﬁrm of type  =  is  = −−−,w h e r e ∈ [01] is the degree
of product substitutability (where an increase in  makes ﬁrms’ products closer substitutes), 
is ﬁrm ’s output and − is the output of ﬁrm ’ competitors. Thus, competition  is mea-
sured through product substitutability () and/or through the number of incumbents () This
speciﬁcation captures the fact that markets with only a few ﬁrms can be highly competitive,
while competition can be weak in markets with a large number of ﬁrms (see Gilbert (2006)).
T h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁtf o raﬁrm of type  (where, for brevity, we omit ownership  on
the right-hand side) is ( −)=( ( −) − ) where ﬁrms of diﬀerent types have
the following marginal costs:
 =  − ¯   =  − ¯   =  (4.5)
Let ∗ =( ∗
∗




 −  =0and let ()=( (∗
∗
−()) − )∗
() be the associated reduced-form



















 .D e ﬁnition 2 implies that ﬁrm h’s price falls in competition. When
increased competition is captured by making products more homogenous, holding the number
of ﬁrms ﬁxed, the acquisition price can nevertheless increase in competition. As shown in the
Appendix, the reason is that the product market price for the acquirer (being a low-cost ﬁrm)
is reduced less than for a non-acquiring rival (being a high-cost ﬁrm), since rivals of a low cost
ﬁrm will reduce their output more than rivals of a high-cost ﬁrm. The smaller reduction in
price even compensates for the fact that the price fall aﬀects more units in the larger acquiring
incumbent. Formally, assuming that ﬁxed costs f are such that Assumption A1 is fulﬁlled, we
have the following Lemma which is proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 3. For  = ,( i )
()
  0 ,( i i )
()






  0 for  ∈
£
min
  ˜ 
¤
.
21Example 2 (Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products (BDP Model)). The
inverse demand function in  = − −− can be inverted into direct demand () where
 =(  −). Deriving reduced-form proﬁts ()=( ∗
 − )(∗) where ∗ is the Nash-








 − ) (4.7)
where the change in a ﬁrm’s proﬁt now depends on its output times its price-cost margin.
Evaluating (4.7) is analytically cumbersome. Therefore, we give a numerical example where
Lemma 3 is also fulﬁlled in the Bertrand model. This shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
Lemma 4. For  = , there exist parameter values in the BDP model where (i)
()
  0 ,
(ii)
()






  0 for  ∈
£
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So far, our results have been derived under the assumption that entry does not aﬀect the number
of ﬁrms on the market. This assumption is relaxed below.
4.3.1. No exit
Let us now turn to the case where entry leads to a less concentrated market structure, i.e. if a
sale occurs there are  active ﬁrms in the market, whereas if entry occurs, there are  +1
active ﬁrms in the market. To this end, we make the assumption:
Assumption A2 E n t r yw i t h o u te x i to fi n c u m b e n t s : ∈ (0 ¯ ()).
Since all incumbents remain on the market, (4.1) becomes:
 −  =[ () − ()+] − [() − ] = {}, (4.8)














R 0  = {}. (4.9)
Thus, under Assumption A2, the innovation transfer eﬀect is now aﬀected by competition.





 ,w ec a n n o td e t e r m i n et h es i g no ft h ee ﬀect of competition
on the net value of an acquisition. To derive more detailed results, we once more use the CDP
model:
Example 3 (CDP model with no exit). Consider the CDP model where entry by the en-
trepreneur now leads to a market structure with both more ﬁrms and more varieties of products.
This implies that ()  () and thereby that, once more, the net value of entry deterrence
is greater than the net value of preemption,  −   −. We can then state the following
Lemma which shows that Propositions 1 and 2 can hold under Assumption A2.
22Lemma 5. Under Assumption A2 in the CDP model, (i) commercialization by entry takes place
for  ∈ (0), (ii) commercialization by sale occurs at sales price ∗ =  for,  ∈ [),
(iii) commercialization by sale occurs at sales price ∗ =  for  ∈ [ ¯ ()) and (iv) sales
price ∗ =  increases in  for some  ∈ [ ¯ ())
Proof. See the Appendix
Thus, increasing the intensity of competition in the diﬀerentiated Cournot model, by making
products closer substitutes, will once more lead to a move from an equilibrium with innovation
for entry to one with innovation for sale, and the acquisition price and, hence, the innovation
incentives can increase when competition is intensiﬁed.
4.3.2. Multiple-incumbent exits
Let us now discuss what will happen if entry leads to more than one incumbent ﬁrm exiting the
market. To this end, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A3 Entry leading to multi-ﬁrm exit:  ∈ ( ¯ ()max)
In this case, the net value of an acquisition deﬁn e di n( 4 . 1 )b e c o m e s :
 −  =  − ()[() − ] = {} (4.10)
Note that the innovation transfer eﬀect is once more given from the ﬁxed cost savings ,
since the number of ﬁrms is the same regardless of commercialization strategy ()=()
when ¯ () which implies that ()=(). Thus, the pattern of commercialization
of the innovation is once more given from how competition aﬀects the opportunity cost of an
acquisition.
Under Assumption A3, we cannot directly determine the sign of the eﬀect of competition
on the net value of an acquisition and hence, the eﬀect of the commercialization pattern is
ambiguous. The reason is that while increased intensity of competition decreases the non-
acquirer’s proﬁta sl o n ga se x i td o e sn o to c c u r ,i tw i l lh a v et h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect exactly at the
point where exit occurs. The reason is that at that point, the non-acquirer’s proﬁti n c r e a s e s
from zero (where exit occurs) to positive. However, it should be noted that the number of active
non-acquirers in the market becomes smaller and will become zero at monopoly where we refer to
this level of competition as . This implies that while there would be situations where small
changes in competition imply that we move from an equilibrium of commercialization by sale to
one with commercialization by entry, commercialization by sale will prevail when the intensity
of competition becomes suﬃciently strong, i.e.  −  =  at  = . Consequently, we
can state the following result:
Proposition 3. For suﬃciently high intensity of competition, there will be innovation for sale,
i.e. there exists a   0 such that for  ∈ (,), ∗ = .
Let us end this section by examining the CDP model in a setting without restrictions on
entry and exits.
23Example 4 (CDP model under A1, A2 and A3). Figure 4.3 illustrates the equilibrium
over the full range of level of intensity of competition, i.e. over A1, A2 and A3. In particular,
it illustrates that the innovation for sale is conducive to high intensity of competition  (since
products become closer substitutes) and that the reward for innovation for sale can increase in
intensity of competition, .
5. Merger policy
H e r e ,w es t u d yt h ee ﬀects of merger policy on the pattern of innovation for sale and entry, and
on the incentive to innovate. In most countries, the basic practice of merger policy implies that
mergers increasing the level of concentration in the market too much will be blocked, unless
t h e r ei sl i k e l yt ob es o m ec o u n t e re ﬀect, for example new entry, making the market power
increase associated with the merger less strong. To capture the basics of such merger policies,
we will here assume that the policy maker simply decides on the minimum number of ﬁrms
allowed in the market; mergers leading to market structures with too few ﬁrms will then be
blocked. Even though this stylized policy abstracts from important features of merger policy
in practice22, we believe that this exercise captures important eﬀects of merger policy on the
innovation incentive for outsiders to the industry. In this vein, it captures long-run innovation
eﬀects of sustaining a ”speciﬁc level of competition” in the industry.23
To this end, we modify the model in the following way: In stage 0, the government commits to
the minimum number of ﬁrms allowed in industry .W ea s s u m et h e r et ob eam e r g e rf o r m a t i o n
game in stage 1 such that the resulting market structure consists of  ≤  incumbent ﬁrms
in the market. We assume that if there is entry by the entrepreneur in stage 3, there will
be an additional merger by two incumbents in stage 4, as ﬁrms react to maintain the level of
concentration allowed by the merger policy. Thereby, the merger policy in stage 0 determines
the number of ﬁrms active in the market in stage 4. Thus, merger policy ”replaces” the exit
condition (3.3). To keep the model tractable, we assume that one of the ﬁr m si sc l o s e dd o w n
in a merger, i.e. we assume that mergers are driven by market power increases and ﬁxed cost
savings,  The eﬀects of allowing for a more elaborate merger formation model are discussed
in Section 6. As in the previous section, we solve the game backwards.
5.1. Why a stricter merger policy may lead to innovation for sale
Let us ﬁrst examine how merger policy will aﬀect the mode of commercialization chosen by the
entrepreneur.
First, note that when entry occurs, two incumbents will merge in stage 4 since such a
22 Note that after the innovation, with only one ﬁrm holding the superior technology, the market
structure will diﬀer from the pre-innovation equilibrium even if the number of ﬁrms is the same. In
principle, ”the minimum number of ﬁrms allowed in the industry” will then depend on the level of
asymmetry. Taking such aspects into account is, however, left to future research.
23 See Motta (2004) for an overview of the practice and a theory of merger policy.
The complexity of the externalities involved in the mergers and investments indicates that informational
constraint will be important for deriving optimal merger policy. An interesting step is then to explicitly
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Figure 4.3: A full solution of the DPC model. Paremeter values at  =3 ,  =4 ,  =1 , ¯  =0 1,
 =0 1 and  =0 7.
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Figure 5.1: The extended game with competition policy.
26merger will now be allowed under the merger policy. Thus, the total number of ﬁr m si sa l w a y s
, regardless of whether the entrepreneur chooses to enter or sell, as the market forces continue
to generate mergers up to the limit allowed by the merger law. It then follows that the entering
entrepreneur obtains exactly the same market position as would the acquiring ﬁrm in case of a
sale of the innovation, i.e. ()=(). Moreover, the successful non-acquiring incumbents
obtain the same market position under entry and sale and thus, we have ()=()
Then, note that a non-acquiring incumbent’s expected proﬁt in stage 3, when there is
innovation for entry by the entrepreneur, is:
E[()] = 1
[() −  − Φ]
| {z }













Exp. proﬁta sn o n - a c q .
(5.1)
where Φ is a transfer or the acquisition price in the merger between the two incumbents in stage
4.




[() − ].24 Hence, the net value of an
acquisition for incumbents from (4.1) in stage 3 can be written:
 −  =
(




[() − ] = 
 −  =  − () = 
(5.2)
To proceed, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A4 The expected proﬁtf o ran o n - a c q u i r e rE[()] = (−1
 )[() − ] is de-
creasing in the number of ﬁrms active in the market





is increasing in  and therefore, the eﬀect of increased competition on the ex-




[()−] cannot be unambiguously determined. However,
straightforward calculations show that Assumption A4 holds in the CDP model.25
Substituting  =  and  =  (ignoring the integer problem) in Deﬁnition 4
and using the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can then state the following
Proposition:
Proposition 4. Assume that A4 holds and  and  exist, then (i) commercialization
by entry takes place if merger policy is non-strict,  ∈ (1 ), (ii) commercialization by
sale occurs at sales price ∗ =  or no sale takes place when merger policy is medium-strict,
 ∈ [ ), and (iii) commercialization by sale occurs at sales price ∗ =  if the merger
policy is very strict,  ∈ [].
Consequently, we have shown that the incentive for innovation for sale relative to innovation
for entry will increase with a stricter merger policy. The stricter merger policy reduces the





()−),w h e r e
−
() is the proﬁt for a non-acquiring incumbent when no merger takes place. This
condition is fulﬁlled for some  ∈ (0
−
()),s i n c e() 
−
().
25 Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
27proﬁtf o ra l lﬁrms in the market. In particular, it reduces it equally for the entrant as for the
acquirer. But the opportunity cost for the acquirer decreases since he is then worse oﬀ as a
non-acquirer.
5.2. The incentive for innovation for sale and merger policy: an inversely U-shaped
relationship
Let us now turn to how the merger policy aﬀects the incentive to innovate. To this end, we
use the CDP model. First, it can be shown that the entry proﬁt decreases when the number of
ﬁrms in the industry increases in the CDP model. Consequently, the incentive for innovation
for entry will be lower under the strict merger policy.
Second, in Appendix 5, it is shown that the acquisition price decreases when the number of
ﬁrms in the industry increases when  ≥ 2, since the acquirer’s product market proﬁtd e c r e a s e s
more than the non-acquirer’s proﬁt. Thus, a strict merger policy reduces the incentive for
innovation for sale when  ≥ 2 However, if the merger policy prevents full monopolization,
i.e.  =1 , things look diﬀerent. A strict merger policy will then have a positive eﬀect on the
incentive for innovation for sale. To see this, note that if  =1 , the acquisition price is ∗ = ,
whereas if  =2∗ = () − ()  . Thus, when full monopolization is prevented by
the merger policy, the acquisition price will be increased. The reason is that here, increased
competition implies the innovator’s bargaining position to be signiﬁcantly improved, because
the buyers then start competing to acquire the innovation.
However, it should be noted that the auction set up without a reservation price in this
situation is less compelling and with a bargaining framework, the total eﬀect on the sales price
going from duopoly to monopoly would be ambiguous. The eﬀect of increasing the bargaining
power of the entrepreneur going from one to two incumbents would still be there, however.
These eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 5.2 where the number of ﬁr m si sad i s c r e t ev a r i a b l e .
Increasing the number of ﬁrms in very concentrated markets increases the incentive for inno-
vation for sale, whereas increasing the number of ﬁrms in less concentrated markets leads to a
reduced incentive for innovation for sale, thereby leading to an inversely U-shaped incentive for
innovation when increasing the intensity of competition by increasing the number of ﬁrms.
Consequently, we have derived the following result:
Proposition 5. In the CDP model: (i) the incentive to innovate for entry will be reduced
under a strict merger policy. (ii) The incentive to innovate for sale will be increased under a
strict merger policy in very concentrated markets, i.e. when the number of incumbent ﬁrms
increases from monopoly to duopoly. (iii) For  ≥ 2, the incentive to innovate for sale will be
reduced under a strict merger policy.
6. Robustness
We here explore how our results are aﬀected by allowing the entrepreneur to sell licences of a
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Figure 5.2: Illustrating Proposition 5. Proﬁts and sales price as a function of merger policy.
Parameter values at Λ =3 =0 5 and ¯  =1 .
296.1. Exclusivity
In the analysis, we have assumed that the seller can only sell the innovation (or the innovative
ﬁrm) exclusively to one buyer. In many cases, the ”innovation” consists of a combination of
assets in terms of capital, intellectual capital, and human capital, which cannot be used by
many ﬁrms simultaneously. Multi-ﬁrm licensing is then not an option. Indeed, we observe
many acquisitions of such small innovative ﬁrms by large incumbents. An example is Cisco’s
acquisition of Cerent at the price of $6.9 billion.
However, in some situations, several buyers might hold a licence to utilize the innovations.
In such situations, the seller might consider how many licences to sell. This issue is studied in
the literature on patent licensing. Kamien and Tauman (1986) assume that the independent
innovator acts as a standard monopolist, by posting a price and allowing the buyers to decide
whether to buy a licence. Then, they show that the number of licences is falling in the quality of
the innovation in such a setting. Allowing the seller to commit to the number of licences to sell,
Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that there exists an equilibrium where some potential buyers are
left without a licence. Consequently, the mechanisms identiﬁed here, which crucially depend on
some ﬁrms facing the risk of becoming non-acquirers, are present also when multi-ﬁrm licensing
is possible. To see this, consider the following extension where the entrepreneur can decide on
how many licences  to licence if not entering. We then consider the Cournot model in stage
3w i t hd i ﬀerentiated products with  incumbents. Let () denote the proﬁt of a buyer of
a licence when there are  licenses for sale. Let () be the proﬁto faﬁrm not buying a
licence. Licensing by the entrepreneur gives the proﬁt Ω = [() − ()].T r e a t i n g as
continuous, the optimal number of licenses is:
Ω0










It can be shown that 0
() − 0
()  0, 0
()  0 and 0
()  0 since more
licenses increase aggregate output and lower the product market price, which aﬀects a larger
ﬁrm more. Assuming that Ω00
  0 and  is suﬃciently large, there exists an optimal ∗  
How does competition aﬀect the choice between licensing and entry? Deﬁne Ω∗(∗) ≡




















 =0from (6.1). Once more, we may then have that Ω∗
  
  0 since
(∗)
  0.
However, Erutku and Richelle (JEMS 2007) and Sen and Tauman (GEB 2007) show that if
more sophisticated contracts can be used in an environment without appropriation problems,
the entrepreneur might have an incentive to licence to all incumbents. An interesting future
extension would be to endogenize when more sophisticated contracts are available and then how
many licenses an entrepreneur would sell.
306.2. Synergies between invention and incumbent assets
Consider the case where there is a synergy  between incumbent assets and the invention.
This will imply that the incumbent can use the invention more eﬃciently, i.e.
()
  0 and
()
  0. It then follows that when the synergy  increases, there is also an increase in the
entry deterring valuation  and the preemptive valuation . Moreover, it follows that, at












   holds for suﬃciently high synergies and thus, we might have a situation where  
   with preemptive acquisitions taking place in equilibrium. This illustrates why the
classical Salant et al. (1983) merger condition is not a necessary condition for an acquisition in
our setting.
Thus, we make the following observation:
Proposition 6. At suﬃciently high synergies between incumbent assets and the invention ,
the inequality I2      in table 3.1 will hold. A preemptive acquisition can then take
place in equilibrium, despite the classical Salant et al. merger condition,    not being
fulﬁlled.
6.3. Asymmetric ﬁrms
What would happen if we allowed for asymmetric ﬁrms? In such a situation, incumbents will
have diﬀerent valuations of the innovation, and the auction game will, in general, be very tedious
to solve since one needs to keep track of many possible orderings of valuations. However, a
suﬃcient condition for commercialization by sale is then that there exists at least one incumbent
 ∈ I for which the net value of a take-over acquisition is positive, i.e. 
 −   0,w h e r e :












The main diﬀerence from the above analysis is that the eﬀects on the entrant’s proﬁt ()
and ﬁrm ’s proﬁt 
() of an increase in the intensity of competition might now diﬀer also when
exit(s) occurs. However, as long as

()
 is not suﬃciently more negative (or more positive)
than
()
 , an increased intensity of competition (or a more restrictive merger policy) will be
conducive to innovation for sale since

()
 is still negative. Note that with asymmetric ﬁrms,
an increase in the intensity of competition will often increase the proﬁts of the more eﬃcient
ﬁrms.26 However, our result carries over also to this case as long as the relations described
above hold.
26 See Boone (2007). In the CDP model, when competition is initially very strong, the proﬁts of the
acquiring incumbent or the entrepreneurial ﬁrm will increase in competition. Since the proﬁto fan o n -
acquiring incumbent always decreases in competition, innovation incentives under innovation for sale will
then be even stronger. This is illustrated in Figure A.1.
31Moreover, if ﬁrms are asymmetric as non-acquirers, the exit game will look diﬀerent. The
most ineﬃcient incumbent(s) would know that it (they) would exit if not acquiring when the
intensity of competition is suﬃciently high. This would then imply that sale would always
be the equilibrium outcome, if entry were to trigger exit(s), i.e. ()=0for the ineﬃcient
incumbent(s).
We have also assumed that one of the ﬁrms is closed down in a merger between incumbents
What would happen if we used a more elaborate merger formation model? The initial merger
process would then create asymmetric incumbents pre-innovation. As above, this would imply
that as long as

()
 is not suﬃciently more negative than
()
 , increased intensity of compe-






We have shown that increased intensity of competition increases the relative proﬁtability of
innovation for sale relative to innovation for entry. Increased competition reduces entrants’
and acquirers’ proﬁts in a similar fashion, but also reduces the proﬁt when not acquiring.
Incumbents’ willingness to pay for the innovation therefore decreases less (increases) and thereby,
the entrepreneur beneﬁts from selling.
We have also shown that a stricter, but not too strict, merger policy tends to increase
the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation,
without reducing the total rents for innovations too much.
Consequently, the fear that increased competition (stricter competition policy) risks harming
incentives to innovate seems less motivated when taking into account that entrepreneurs can
sell their innovations.
In the previous literature, it has been shown that how product market competition aﬀects
the incentive for inhouse (incumbent or entrant) innovation depends on how competition aﬀects
the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the market with an innovation and the proﬁti tm a k e s
in the market absent the innovation. Policies increasing the intensity of competition in the
market absent innovations will then stimulate the incentive for innovation through the so-called
"escape-competition eﬀect".27
We instead study how increased competition aﬀects the incentive to innovate for sale. The
equilibrium sales price of an invention is determined by the diﬀerence between an incumbent’s
proﬁts as an acquirer and its proﬁts as a non-acquirer. This implies that the proﬁts in the
pre-innovation market do not aﬀect the incentive to innovate for sale. Consequently, in markets
where innovation for sale is important, non-expected discretionary policy changes increasing
competition in the market absent the innovation may have small eﬀects on the innovation in-
centives. Committed long-run policies, balancing the need for diﬀerentiating proﬁts between
ﬁrms acquiring the top notch innovation and non-acquiring ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and the need for prod-
uct market competition, instead seem more suitable for stimulating the incentive for innovation
for sale.
27 See Aghion et al. (2005) and Arrow (1962).
32Aghion et al. (2005) empirically document an inverted U-shaped relationship between prod-
uct market competition and innovation in the UK, using the privatizations during the Thatcher
regime, the EU single-market program, and the investigations performed by the Monopoly and
Merger Commission to instrument for changes in competition. They also provide a theoret-
ical model explaining this pattern. In their model, the incentive for innovation can increase
when the intensity of competition increases since pre-innovation proﬁts are reduced more than
post-innovation proﬁts. This ”escape competition eﬀect” stimulates innovations, particularly
in industries where ﬁrms are operating at similar technology levels. However, in more laggard
industries, competition reduces innovative activities. An inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween competition and innovation is then due to the composition of laggard and technologically
advanced industries. In our model, the inverted U-shaped relationship between competition
and innovation is instead due to how the diﬀerence between the proﬁt as an acquirer of the
innovation and the proﬁt as a non-acquirer is aﬀected by changes in competition in a single
industry. In particular, we derive such an inversely U-shaped relationship on the innovation for
sale of stricter merger policy.
Another testable prediction of the model is that a country with a higher intensity of com-
petition, such as the US, would have a higher share of innovation for sale over innovation for
entry than a country with a low intensity of competition, like an EU country say. Yet another
prediction is that countries implementing stricter merger policies, such as EU countries in the
1990s, should experience more innovation for sale relative to innovation for entry. More gener-
ally, our model suggests that diﬀerent aspects of competition and competition policy can have
very diﬀerent empirical implications on the innovation pattern.
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37A. Appendix
A . 1 .P r o o fo fL e m m a1
First, note that  ≥ max= {ei} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no incumbent will
post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the innovation and that ﬁrm
 will accept a bid iﬀ   .
Inequality I1 Consider equilibrium candidate ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2). Let us assume that in-
cumbent  6=  is the incumbent that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets and
ﬁrm  6=  is the incumbent with the second highest bid.
Then, ∗
 ≥  is a weakly dominated strategy. ∗
   − is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm
 6=  then beneﬁts from deviating to  = ∗
+ since it will then obtain the assets and pay a
price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If ∗
 = −,a n d∗
 ∈ [−−2],t h e nn o
incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to , the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, . Accordingly, the entrepreneur has
no incentive to deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. Let incumbent  be the incumbent with the
highest bid. The entrepreneur will then say  iﬀ  ≤ . But incumbent  6=  will have the
incentive to deviate to 0 =  +  in stage 1, since   . This contradicts the assumption
that  is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider equilibrium candidate ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2). Then, ∗
 ≥  is a weakly
dominated strategy. ∗
   −  is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm  6=  then beneﬁts from
deviating to  = ∗
 +  since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its
valuation of obtaining them. If ∗
 =  − ,a n d∗
 ∈ [ −  − 2], then no incumbent has
an incentive to deviate. By deviating to , the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes
a selling price exceeding its valuation, . Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to
deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium candidate ∗∗ =( ∗∗
1  ∗∗
2 ) Then, ∗
 ≥  is not an equi-
librium since the entrepreneur would then beneﬁt by deviating to .I f ∗
 ≤ ,t h e nn o
incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to , the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases
since it then sells its assets at a price below its valuation, . The entrepreneur has no incentive
to deviate and thus, ∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I3 Consider the equilibrium candidate ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2) Then, ∗
 ≥  is a
weakly dominated strategy. ∗
   −  is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm  6=  then beneﬁts
from deviating to  = ∗
 + since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its
valuation of obtaining them. If ∗
 = −,a n d∗
 ∈ [−−2], then no incumbent has an
incentive to deviate. By deviating to , the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases, since it foregoes
a selling price exceeding its valuation, . Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to
deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say  iﬀ  ≤ .
But incumbent  6=  will then have the incentive to deviate to 0 =  +  in stage 1, since
38  . This contradicts the assumption that  is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I4 Consider the equilibrium candidate ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2) Then, ∗
   is not
an equilibrium since ﬁrm  would then beneﬁt from deviating to  = . ∗
   is not
an equilibrium, since the entrepreneur would then not accept any bid. If ∗
 =  − ,t h e n
ﬁrm  has no incentive to deviate By deviating to 0
 ≤ ∗
, ﬁrm ’s,  6= ,p a y o ﬀ does
not change. By deviating to 0
  ∗
 ﬁrm ’s payoﬀ decreases since it must pay a price above
its willingness to pay . Accordingly, ﬁrm  has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to
, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price above its valuation, .
Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. If  ≥ ,t h e nﬁrm  will have the incentive
to deviate to 0 =  − .I f  , the entrepreneur will have the incentive to deviate to ,
which contradicts the assumption that  is a Nash equilibrium.
Let  =( 1 ) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say  iﬀ  ≤ .
But incumbent  6=  will have the incentive to deviate to 0 =  +  in stage 1 since   ,
which contradicts the assumption that  is a Nash equilibrium.




∀ ∈  It then directly follows that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus, ∗ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Then, note that the entrepreneur will accept a bid iﬀ  ≥  But  ≥  is a weakly
dominating bid in these intervals since   max{ } Thus, the assets will not be sold in
these intervals.
A.2. The Cournot Diﬀerentiated Product (CDP) model
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Λ  0. Let us then
show that
()
  0.W e ﬁrst show that there exists no minimum min






=0 .S o l v ef o r¯  as a function  which fulﬁlls
()
 =0  Denote this by ()
and note that ()=−
(−1)Λ(2−)2
(2−2+4)  0 since  ∈ [01]. Hence, since ¯ 0, there exists no
() such that
()
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(Size of the innovation: k ̄  1)
(Size of the innovation: k ̄  1)
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Figure A.1: Proﬁts and sales price in the DPC model as a function of product substitutability.
Parameter values at Λ =3 =3  ¯  =1in panels (i) and (ii).
40Proof part (ii): We need to show that () for  =  is strictly convex in  with a unique
minimum min
 ,w h e r emin
  min
 .S o l v ef o r¯  as a function  which fulﬁlls
()
 =0  Denote
this by () ( t h i sl i n ei sm a r k e db y
()




((+1)−2+4) = ()  0, (0) = ∞ and (1) = 4Λ
(+2)  4Λ
(+3) = (1) 
0,
()
 = −4(2− )Λ
2−+
(−2+4)22  0 and that
()
 = −4(2− )Λ
2−+(+1)
((+1)−2+4)22  0.
Since () is continuous and monotonically decreasing in , it follows that for each ¯ 0,
there exists a unique min
 ∈ [01], such that (a)
()




for  ∈ (min
 1) and (b) min
  min








¡¯  + Λ
¢












 =0  0 this implies that () for  =  is strictly
convex in  with a unique minimum min
 ,w h e r emin
  min
 
Proof part (iii): We need to show that for  =2 , 
  0,w h i l ef o r2,  =  is strictly
convex in  with a unique minimum min
  min
  min
 .N o t et h a t∗ =  =  ()− ()
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22  0 since −4+3+6−3 =( 2 −)(−2+3)+  0 since
 ∈ [01].28. By calculation, we have ()−()=( 2− )Λ
2+4−2+22
(−+4)(4+3−4+2−6) 
0 and hence from A.2 ()  ()  ().S i n c e () is a monotonous function of ,
it follows that for each ¯ 0, there exists a unique min
 ∈ [01] such that (a) ∗
  0 for
 ∈ [0min
 ) and 
  0 for  ∈ (min
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A.2.1. Illustration with Bertrand competition
First, invert the inverse demand function in () into direct demand () where  =(  −).















Then, rewrite ﬁrm ’ proﬁta s =( −)(). Making use of (A.4) and maximizing 
with regard to  and solving for each ownership structure  = , it is straightforward to derive
the Nash-Bertrand price vector, ∗(). Inserting into (A.4) and using the proﬁt ,w ec a nd e r i v e












3  1 This implies that 



















Figure A.2: Proﬁts and sales price as a function of product substitatbility under Bertrand
competition. Parameter values at Λ =3 =3and ¯  =1 .
a reduced-form proﬁt ()=( ∗
−)(∗) which can once more be examined by changing the
product substitutability parameter,  As illustrated in Figure A.2, the results are qualitatively
the same as when assuming identical parameter values as in Figure A.1, which assumes Cournot
competition. Through this example, Lemma 3 also holds for Bertrand competition.
A . 2 . 2 .P r o o fo fL e m m a5
Let  =  =0and note that  =0 −  =  −  = −1
4Λ2  0.( a ) W e ﬁrst derive the
solution for all parameter values fulﬁlling the equation  −  =0  To this end, we solve the
equation for
¯ 




  1 and
¯ 2





Λ  1 is required for ∗
() ≥ 0,o n l y¯ 2 is admissible. Let
¯ 2





(3−+6)22  0 (0) = ∞,a n d(1) = +1
3+5  1 Since
() is continuous and monotonically decreasing in  and ( =0 )− ( =0 ) 0,i t
follows that for each
¯ 2





























Figure A.3: Solving for innovation for sale and innovation for entry as a function of competition
in the DPC model. The number of incumbents is set to  =3 .
   for  .
(b) We now derive the solution for all parameter values fulﬁlling the equation  −  =0 
To this end, we solve the equation for
¯ 




  1 and
¯ 2
Λ =( 2− )
−42+22+22+4−8+4
(322+12−62+22−12+12).S i n c e
¯ 1
Λ  1 is required for ∗
() ≥ 0, only ¯ 2
is admissible. Let
¯ 2
Λ = () Then, it can be shown that
()
  0 (0) = ∞,a n d
(1) = 2−2
6+32+2  1 Since () is continuous and monotonically decreasing in  and
( =0 )− ( =0 ) 0, it follows that for each
¯ 2
Λ  0 there exists a unique  such that
   for   and    for  .
(c) Since   , it follows that () is below and to the left of ().
(d) For 0,w eh a v e =  ()−. It then follows that increasing  for  ∈ [0 ()]
will reduce () and () and, hence,  and  are decreasing in .
(e) The above derived properties are then used to draw the curves in Figure A.3.
A . 2 . 3 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
First, note that Λ(2 − ) − ¯ 0 from ∗
()  0 in (A.1). Using diﬀerentiation, we have
()
 = −2(2¯ (1−)+Λ(2−)+¯ )[Λ(2−)−¯ ]
(−+2)3(2−)2  0 for  = ,
()





 = −2 (Λ(2−)−¯ )¯ 
(−+2)2(2−2)2  0 hold in these intervals. It is straightforward to show that
the same results hold when the number of ﬁrms  is a discrete variable.
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